Abstract
It has been argued that neither the biological or the moral justifications commonly given for adoption of brain-death criteria are adequate; and that the only argument that succeeds is an ontological justification based on the fact that one's personal identity terminates with the death of one's brain. But a more satisfactory ontological approach analyzes brain death in terms of the existence of a person in connection with a body, not personal identity. The personal-existence justification does not supplant the usual biological and moral arguments, but acts in concert with them.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 187-196 |
Number of pages | 10 |
Journal | The Journal of medicine and philosophy |
Volume | 8 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 1983 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Issues, ethics and legal aspects
- Philosophy