Brain death and personal existence: a reply to Green and Wikler.

H. Brody

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

It has been argued that neither the biological or the moral justifications commonly given for adoption of brain-death criteria are adequate; and that the only argument that succeeds is an ontological justification based on the fact that one's personal identity terminates with the death of one's brain. But a more satisfactory ontological approach analyzes brain death in terms of the existence of a person in connection with a body, not personal identity. The personal-existence justification does not supplant the usual biological and moral arguments, but acts in concert with them.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)187-196
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Medicine and Philosophy
Volume8
Issue number2
StatePublished - May 1983
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Brain Death
brain
death
human being
Ontological
Justification
Personal Identity
Person
Moral Justification

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Brain death and personal existence : a reply to Green and Wikler. / Brody, H.

In: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 05.1983, p. 187-196.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{36773d44a9304ca0bd791a078bbe1ca3,
title = "Brain death and personal existence: a reply to Green and Wikler.",
abstract = "It has been argued that neither the biological or the moral justifications commonly given for adoption of brain-death criteria are adequate; and that the only argument that succeeds is an ontological justification based on the fact that one's personal identity terminates with the death of one's brain. But a more satisfactory ontological approach analyzes brain death in terms of the existence of a person in connection with a body, not personal identity. The personal-existence justification does not supplant the usual biological and moral arguments, but acts in concert with them.",
author = "H. Brody",
year = "1983",
month = "5",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "8",
pages = "187--196",
journal = "Journal of Medicine and Philosophy",
issn = "0360-5310",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Brain death and personal existence

T2 - a reply to Green and Wikler.

AU - Brody, H.

PY - 1983/5

Y1 - 1983/5

N2 - It has been argued that neither the biological or the moral justifications commonly given for adoption of brain-death criteria are adequate; and that the only argument that succeeds is an ontological justification based on the fact that one's personal identity terminates with the death of one's brain. But a more satisfactory ontological approach analyzes brain death in terms of the existence of a person in connection with a body, not personal identity. The personal-existence justification does not supplant the usual biological and moral arguments, but acts in concert with them.

AB - It has been argued that neither the biological or the moral justifications commonly given for adoption of brain-death criteria are adequate; and that the only argument that succeeds is an ontological justification based on the fact that one's personal identity terminates with the death of one's brain. But a more satisfactory ontological approach analyzes brain death in terms of the existence of a person in connection with a body, not personal identity. The personal-existence justification does not supplant the usual biological and moral arguments, but acts in concert with them.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0020755221&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0020755221&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Article

C2 - 6886575

AN - SCOPUS:0020755221

VL - 8

SP - 187

EP - 196

JO - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy

JF - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy

SN - 0360-5310

IS - 2

ER -