Brain death and personal existence: a reply to Green and Wikler.

H. Brody

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Scopus citations


It has been argued that neither the biological or the moral justifications commonly given for adoption of brain-death criteria are adequate; and that the only argument that succeeds is an ontological justification based on the fact that one's personal identity terminates with the death of one's brain. But a more satisfactory ontological approach analyzes brain death in terms of the existence of a person in connection with a body, not personal identity. The personal-existence justification does not supplant the usual biological and moral arguments, but acts in concert with them.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)187-196
Number of pages10
JournalJournal of Medicine and Philosophy
Issue number2
StatePublished - May 1983
Externally publishedYes


ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

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