Modeling potential responses to smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon

Martin I. Meltzer, Inger Damon, James LeDuc, J. Donald Millar

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

179 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We constructed a mathematical model to describe the spread of smallpox after a deliberate release of the virus. Assuming 100 persons initially infected and 3 persons infected per infectious person, quarantine alone could stop disease transmission but would require a minimum daily removal rate of 50% of those with overt symptoms. Vaccination would stop the outbreak within 365 days after release only if disease transmission were reduced to ≥0.85 persons infected per infectious person. A combined vaccination and quarantine campaign could stop an outbreak if a daily quarantine rate of 25% were achieved and vaccination reduced smallpox transmission by ≥33%. In such a scenario, approximately 4,200 cases would occur and 365 days would be needed to stop the outbreak. Historical data indicate that a median of 2,155 smallpox vaccine doses per case were given to stop outbreaks, implying that a stockpile of 40 million doses should be adequate.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)959-969
Number of pages11
JournalEmerging Infectious Diseases
Volume7
Issue number6
StatePublished - 2001
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Smallpox
Weapons
Quarantine
Disease Outbreaks
Vaccination
Smallpox Vaccine
Virus Release
Immunization Programs
Theoretical Models

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Microbiology (medical)

Cite this

Meltzer, M. I., Damon, I., LeDuc, J., & Millar, J. D. (2001). Modeling potential responses to smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 7(6), 959-969.

Modeling potential responses to smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon. / Meltzer, Martin I.; Damon, Inger; LeDuc, James; Millar, J. Donald.

In: Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 7, No. 6, 2001, p. 959-969.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Meltzer, MI, Damon, I, LeDuc, J & Millar, JD 2001, 'Modeling potential responses to smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon', Emerging Infectious Diseases, vol. 7, no. 6, pp. 959-969.
Meltzer, Martin I. ; Damon, Inger ; LeDuc, James ; Millar, J. Donald. / Modeling potential responses to smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon. In: Emerging Infectious Diseases. 2001 ; Vol. 7, No. 6. pp. 959-969.
@article{66ea699147b54259b4fb5d7eb2903654,
title = "Modeling potential responses to smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon",
abstract = "We constructed a mathematical model to describe the spread of smallpox after a deliberate release of the virus. Assuming 100 persons initially infected and 3 persons infected per infectious person, quarantine alone could stop disease transmission but would require a minimum daily removal rate of 50{\%} of those with overt symptoms. Vaccination would stop the outbreak within 365 days after release only if disease transmission were reduced to ≥0.85 persons infected per infectious person. A combined vaccination and quarantine campaign could stop an outbreak if a daily quarantine rate of 25{\%} were achieved and vaccination reduced smallpox transmission by ≥33{\%}. In such a scenario, approximately 4,200 cases would occur and 365 days would be needed to stop the outbreak. Historical data indicate that a median of 2,155 smallpox vaccine doses per case were given to stop outbreaks, implying that a stockpile of 40 million doses should be adequate.",
author = "Meltzer, {Martin I.} and Inger Damon and James LeDuc and Millar, {J. Donald}",
year = "2001",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "7",
pages = "959--969",
journal = "Emerging Infectious Diseases",
issn = "1080-6040",
publisher = "Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)",
number = "6",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Modeling potential responses to smallpox as a bioterrorist weapon

AU - Meltzer, Martin I.

AU - Damon, Inger

AU - LeDuc, James

AU - Millar, J. Donald

PY - 2001

Y1 - 2001

N2 - We constructed a mathematical model to describe the spread of smallpox after a deliberate release of the virus. Assuming 100 persons initially infected and 3 persons infected per infectious person, quarantine alone could stop disease transmission but would require a minimum daily removal rate of 50% of those with overt symptoms. Vaccination would stop the outbreak within 365 days after release only if disease transmission were reduced to ≥0.85 persons infected per infectious person. A combined vaccination and quarantine campaign could stop an outbreak if a daily quarantine rate of 25% were achieved and vaccination reduced smallpox transmission by ≥33%. In such a scenario, approximately 4,200 cases would occur and 365 days would be needed to stop the outbreak. Historical data indicate that a median of 2,155 smallpox vaccine doses per case were given to stop outbreaks, implying that a stockpile of 40 million doses should be adequate.

AB - We constructed a mathematical model to describe the spread of smallpox after a deliberate release of the virus. Assuming 100 persons initially infected and 3 persons infected per infectious person, quarantine alone could stop disease transmission but would require a minimum daily removal rate of 50% of those with overt symptoms. Vaccination would stop the outbreak within 365 days after release only if disease transmission were reduced to ≥0.85 persons infected per infectious person. A combined vaccination and quarantine campaign could stop an outbreak if a daily quarantine rate of 25% were achieved and vaccination reduced smallpox transmission by ≥33%. In such a scenario, approximately 4,200 cases would occur and 365 days would be needed to stop the outbreak. Historical data indicate that a median of 2,155 smallpox vaccine doses per case were given to stop outbreaks, implying that a stockpile of 40 million doses should be adequate.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0035198384&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0035198384&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Article

VL - 7

SP - 959

EP - 969

JO - Emerging Infectious Diseases

JF - Emerging Infectious Diseases

SN - 1080-6040

IS - 6

ER -