Potential impact of a 2-person security rule on BioSafety Level 4 laboratory workers

James LeDuc, Kevin Anderson, Marshall E. Bloom, Ricardo Carrion, Heinz Feldmann, J. Patrick Fitch, Joan B. Geisbert, Thomas Geisbert, Michael R. Holbrook, Peter B. Jahrling, Thomas Ksiazek, Jean Patterson, Pierre E. Rollin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Directors of all major BioSafety Level 4 (BSL-4) laboratories in the United States met in 2008 to review the current status of biocontainment laboratory operations and to discuss the potential impact of a proposed 2-person security rule on maximum-containment laboratory operations. Special attention was paid to the value and risks that would result from a requirement that 2 persons be physically present in the laboratory at all times. A consensus emerged indicating that a video monitoring system represents a more efficient, economical standard; provides greater assurance that pathogens are properly manipulated; and offers an increased margin of employee safety and institutional security. The 2-person security rule (1 to work and 1 to observe) may decrease compliance with dual responsibilities of safety and security by placing undue pressure on the person being observed to quickly finish the work, and by placing the observer in the containment environment unnecessarily.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalEmerging Infectious Diseases
Volume15
Issue number7
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2009

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Microbiology (medical)
  • Infectious Diseases
  • Epidemiology

Cite this

LeDuc, J., Anderson, K., Bloom, M. E., Carrion, R., Feldmann, H., Fitch, J. P., ... Rollin, P. E. (2009). Potential impact of a 2-person security rule on BioSafety Level 4 laboratory workers. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 15(7). https://doi.org/10.3201/eid1507.081523

Potential impact of a 2-person security rule on BioSafety Level 4 laboratory workers. / LeDuc, James; Anderson, Kevin; Bloom, Marshall E.; Carrion, Ricardo; Feldmann, Heinz; Fitch, J. Patrick; Geisbert, Joan B.; Geisbert, Thomas; Holbrook, Michael R.; Jahrling, Peter B.; Ksiazek, Thomas; Patterson, Jean; Rollin, Pierre E.

In: Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 15, No. 7, 07.2009.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

LeDuc, J, Anderson, K, Bloom, ME, Carrion, R, Feldmann, H, Fitch, JP, Geisbert, JB, Geisbert, T, Holbrook, MR, Jahrling, PB, Ksiazek, T, Patterson, J & Rollin, PE 2009, 'Potential impact of a 2-person security rule on BioSafety Level 4 laboratory workers', Emerging Infectious Diseases, vol. 15, no. 7. https://doi.org/10.3201/eid1507.081523
LeDuc, James ; Anderson, Kevin ; Bloom, Marshall E. ; Carrion, Ricardo ; Feldmann, Heinz ; Fitch, J. Patrick ; Geisbert, Joan B. ; Geisbert, Thomas ; Holbrook, Michael R. ; Jahrling, Peter B. ; Ksiazek, Thomas ; Patterson, Jean ; Rollin, Pierre E. / Potential impact of a 2-person security rule on BioSafety Level 4 laboratory workers. In: Emerging Infectious Diseases. 2009 ; Vol. 15, No. 7.
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